AI Exposure vs BLS 2024–2034 Employment Growth

Headline statistic

Per massenkoff-mccrory-labor-market-impacts-2026 Figure 4 and accompanying regression:

A regression at the occupation level weighted by current employment finds slope = −6.07 (SE 1.32), R² = 0.027. For every 10-percentage-point increase in observed AI exposure, BLS projected 2024–2034 employment growth drops by 0.6 percentage points.

The relationship is weak in R² but statistically significant and survives the BLS’s own independently constructed projections.

Critically: no equivalent correlation exists when using Eloundou et al. β (theoretical capability) alone. Realized usage adds predictive value the theoretical measure lacks.

What the scatter shows

Binned scatterplot with 25 equally sized bins; small squares mark named example occupations:

OccupationApprox. exposureApprox. projected 2024–34 growth
Software developers~30%+14% (top outlier)
Electricians~0%+10%
Registered nurses~10%+5%
Lawyers~18%+3%
Accountants~30%+4%
(avg trend)50%~0%
Customer service reps~70%−2.5%
Cashiers~10%−6%

The trend line is clearly downward sloping through 25 binned points, despite the substantial residual variance (R² = 0.027 means 97% of variance is not explained by exposure).

Interpretation

What the result supports

  • Independent validation of observed-exposure-measure. BLS analysts (separate methodology, separate data, separate institution) produce growth forecasts that align directionally with Anthropic’s usage-weighted exposure. Two independent measures pointing at the same occupations is meaningful triangulation.
  • Diffusion-aware exposure beats theoretical-only exposure. The same data, scored with Eloundou’s β alone, produces no significant correlation. Usage data is the missing layer. See theoretical-vs-observed-capability-gap.
  • Software developers are the strategic outlier. High exposure and high projected growth. The most plausible reading: developers are the workers who use AI most productively while their labor demand grows fastest (because the work AI enables — building more software — itself demands more developers, Jevons-Paradox-style). See jevons-paradox-ai.

What the result does not support

  • It is not a forecast of AI’s labor impact. BLS projections are themselves model-based and may already partially price in AI deployment. The correlation could reflect what BLS analysts expect rather than what will happen.
  • The R² is low. 97% of cross-occupation growth variance is not explained by AI exposure. Other forces (demographic shifts, demand reallocation, business-cycle effects) dominate.
  • The “−0.6 pp per 10 pp” magnitude is modest. Customer service reps at 70% exposure correspond to ~−4 pp adjustment; even a tripling of the slope leaves most occupations within their historical band.

Why this matters to Where Value Lands

  • Bridges the empirical and projective frames. The exposure measure is now anchored to an independent labor-economist forecast, not merely Anthropic-internal usage data.
  • Confirms the diffusion-vs-innovation frame at the BLS horizon. Analysts are projecting that the diffusion will deepen and affect employment, even if current unemployment data shows no signal (unemployment-did-exposed-workers).
  • Updates H2_u-curve-of-value. Software developers as a high-exposure / high-growth outlier is a top-of-U story: developers occupy the L4–L6 application-layer interface and capture the surplus from automation rather than bearing the cost.

Caveats

  • BLS projections have a mixed track record. The source acknowledges that government growth forecasts have “added little predictive value beyond linear extrapolation of past trends.” Massenkoff (2025) is cited.
  • Endogeneity. BLS analysts read AI news; their projections may already incorporate the same exposure signal Massenkoff & McCrory measure. The independence of the two measures is partial, not clean.