Sectoral AI Diffusion Pattern
AI use is concentrated where AI is made. In 2024, ~45% of firms in the ICT sector and ~26% in Professional, scientific & technical activities used AI across OECD countries — three to six times the adoption rate of Construction (7.2%), Accommodation & food services (7.8%), or Transportation & storage (9.2%). The ICT sector also scores top-quartile on every dimension of AI intensity (human capital, innovation, exposure, use). Source: oecd-sme-ai-adoption-2025.
This is the sectoral compounding factor behind the sme-ai-adoption-gap. Even comparing firms of similar size and age, sectoral composition shifts adoption rates by a multiple.
The pattern
Three concentric layers:
- AI-intensive sectors. ICT (Media, IT services, Telecommunications), Scientific R&D, Legal & accounting, Finance & insurance. Top-quartile across all four AI-intensity dimensions in the Calvino et al. (2024) sectoral taxonomy.
- Mid-intensity sectors. Manufacturing of transport equipment, machinery, computer & electronics; Wholesale & retail. Second or third quartile. AI-relevant but not AI-native.
- Low-intensity sectors. Construction, Hotels & food services, Textiles, Wood & paper, Transportation & storage. Bottom-quartile across most dimensions. These are the bulk of the SME population in OECD economies.
The same hierarchy holds in every G7 country: ICT adoption rates are typically more than 3× manufacturing’s.
What “AI intensity” packages together
The Calvino et al. multidimensional indicator distinguishes:
- AI human capital — share of workers in AI-relevant occupations.
- AI innovation — patents and publications in the sector.
- AI exposure (barrier-adjusted) — share of tasks technically exposed to AI, weighted by adoption barriers.
- AI use — share of firms adopting.
The four scores correlate but are not identical. ICT and IT services score top-quartile on all four — they make the technology, adopt it earliest, and have the workers to deploy it. Manufacturing sub-sectors are split: Computer & electronics is top-quartile, transport equipment / machinery is middle, food / textile / wood is bottom. The decomposition lets us see that “manufacturing” as a single category hides a 3–4× internal range.
The good news
The increase is an all-sector phenomenon. Between 2021 and 2024, OECD-wide adoption roughly doubled in most sectors:
- ICT: +20 percentage points (from ~25% to ~45%)
- Professional services: +13 pp
- Wholesale trade: +8 pp
- Manufacturing: ~+5 pp (a 70% relative increase from a low base)
- Transportation & storage: ~+3.5 pp (a 60% relative increase)
The largest absolute increases are in already-high-adoption sectors — i.e., the sectoral gap is widening in absolute terms even as it narrows in relative terms. ICT pulled away from manufacturing by ~15 pp in three years.
Why this matters for the U-curve
- The “long-tail application layer” is concentrated in low-intensity sectors. If the bottom-right of H2_u-curve-of-value is “SMEs in construction, hospitality, transport, retail” — the literal majority of European economic activity by employment — those sectors are at single-digit AI adoption rates. The U’s bottom-right is thin where the population is thickest.
- The “shaping” sectors are also the producing sectors. Calvino et al. note that ICT and professional services are simultaneously the largest adopters and the largest suppliers of AI. This is a recursion: the part of the economy that captures most AI surplus today is the part that builds the technology. This is consistent with the capital-labor-divergence story — value flows from the rest of the economy into the AI-producing sector via vendor relationships.
- Diffusion S-curve. Per diffusion-vs-innovation, the GPT winner is whoever absorbs the technology fastest across all productive sectors. The sectoral pattern shows the OECD is still early on that curve — manufacturing, construction, and transport are at the bottom of the S.
Tensions
- Sector-mix vs sector-effect. Larger firms tend to be in different sectors than smaller firms; some of the sme-ai-adoption-gap is a sector compositional effect. But OECD work (Calvino & Fontanelli 2023) shows the size gap persists within sector — sector is a compounding factor, not the full explanation.
- AI intensity ≠ AI value-capture. The Computer & electronics sector scores top-quartile on use and intensity, but its margin profile is not obviously richer than Media or IT services. The sectoral taxonomy measures adoption, not capture.
- Definitions drift. “AI use” in 2021 surveys covers a narrower technology set than “AI use” in 2024 surveys (generative AI is the most striking addition). Trend comparisons should be read with this in mind.
Related
- oecd-sme-ai-adoption-2025 — primary source.
- sme-ai-adoption-gap — the inter-firm gap this sectoral pattern compounds.
- oecd-sectoral-ai-adoption-2024 — the data block behind this concept.
- diffusion-vs-innovation — the diffusion-S-curve framing.
- H2_u-curve-of-value — the U’s bottom-right is thin where the population is thickest.
- capital-labor-divergence — surplus flow from low-intensity sectors to AI-producing sectors.
- vertical-ai-orchestration — what a successful sectoral-AI deployment looks like in industrial verticals.
- deloitte-ai-dossier-eri — the ER&I instantiation of this pattern.
- ai-productivity-firm-level — the productivity link this concept sits inside.